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RECENT DECISIONS
effect of the approach of death, the declarant should appear to have had
a consciousness of the approach of death; and this consciousness must
of course exist at the time of making the declaration.s
Thus if a declarant believes and exhibits the belief that his death is
imminent and because of this belief makes a statement naming his
assailant, the declaration should be admissible as a dying declaration.
However, the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case are ap-
plied to the rule and if the rule is satisfied then the statement is ad-
missible. In the instant case, the declarant, Mrs. Allen received the last
rites of her church shortly after arriving at the hospital, suffering from
an abdominal wound inflicted by a bread knife. She made repeated
statements to various people that she thought she was going to die,
and during the 5 days she lived, she never once expressed any belief
or hope of recovery. There was no evidence to indicate that Mrs. Allen
thought her death was imminent or that she made her statement be-
cause of the fear of imminent death. The declaration in dispute was
made to the declarant's mother about twelve hours before death in
narrative fashion recounting the events of the stabbing.
It is the opinion of the writer that the Court of Appeals was correct
in holding the declaration inadmissible because, applying the rule to
the facts in the instant case, it is clear that the declarant, Mrs. Allen,
did not speak under a sense of impending death and as a result of the
sense of impending death. Therefore since the rule was not satisfied
the Court of Appeals in the instant case could only reverse the judg-
ment, assuming the settled rules as to dying declarations may not be
broadened except by statute.9
EMIL SEBETIC
Labor Law - Evidence Necessary to Sustain Allegation of Discrimina-
tory Discharge - Complainant union brought this action against re-
spondent employer alleging that respondent was committing unfair
labor practices in violation of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act.,
The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board found the following
facts: respondent in its wholesale hardware business maintained a large
warehouse in the city of Madison, Wisconsin; merchandise was shipped
s People v. Becker, 215 N.Y. 126, 109 N.E. 127 (1915).
9Sowell v. State, 30 Ala. App. 18, 199 So. 900 (1941).
'Section 111.06(1) provides "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer individually or in concert with others: (a) To interfere with, restrain
or coerce his employes in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
111.94 . . . (c) 1. To encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization, employe agency, committee, association or representation plan
by discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure or other terms or conditions
of employment; provided, that an employer shall not be prohibited from
entering into an all-union agreement with the representatives of his employes
in a collective bargaining unit, . . ." Section 111.04 guarantees to employes
freedom in joining or refusing to join unions. Wis. Stat. (1949), Chap. 111.
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to this warehouse, unloaded and reshipped by respondent to its cus-
tomers; prior to April 15, 1949, respondent employed twenty-one per-
sons in the warehouse to process merchandise; that all warehouse
employes with the exception of a superintendent in general charge are
production employes and properly includable in any union which may
be formed; that four of the includable warehouse employes also exer-
cised supervisory duties; for some time prior to April 15, 1949, the
warehouse employes were, within the knowledge of respondent, en-
gaged in organizational activities and on or about April 7, 1949, twenty
of the said twenty-one employes had signed application cards for mem-
bership in complainant union; on April 15, 1949, respondent discharged
seven of the warehouse employes, all of whom were union members
and among whom were two of the four includable supervisors; at the
time of the said discharges, respondent informed the said seven em-
ployes that the discharges were temporary lay-offs and were necessary
because of lack of work; respondent then elevated two employes with
much less experience to take the place of the two discharged super-
visors; on April 18, 1949, respondent discharged an office employee,
who was active in organizational activities for incompetence; on April
25, 1949, respondent discharged two more union member warehouse
employes and on May 4, 1949, discharged one more union member
employed in the said warehouse; respondent employed eight buyers
who prior to April 1, 1949, occasionally assisted the regular warehouse
employes in picking and packing orders and since April 15, 1949, these
buyers have devoted a very substantial part of their time to such work;
that immediately after the discharges of April 15th, respondent's man-
ager called a meeting of the warehouse employes at which he announced
a seventeen cent per hour general wage increase; also at this time the
employer entered into written agreemnts with six of the retained
employees ;2 that there is a decided slump in respondent employer's
business; that just prior to the discharges respondent employer called
a meeting of all warehouse employes and informed them of the said
business slump and also of the company policy of maintaining steady
employment for all employes.
On the basis of this finding of facts, the Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board held: the discharges of the warehouse employes were
discriminatory and a violation of Section 111.06 (1) (a) and (c) Wis.
Stats. of 1947, and ordered reinstatement of the two discharged super-
visors and the placement of the rest of the discharged employes, with
the exception of the office worker, on a preferential hiring list.
2 In a memorandum accompaning its decision the Board stated that the written
agreements signed by five of the warehouse employes on April 15th were
monthly wage agreements.
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In a memorandum accompanying the decision, the Board laid strong
emphasis on the following factors: (1) there was a complete departure
from company policy in these discharges; (2) the two supervisors who
were discharged were immediately replaced by men with much less
experience; (3) the plant manager had requested one of his employes
to keep him informed with respect to organizational activities; (4) at
the time of the discharges the manager informed the employes that
they were laid off temporarily, while at the time of the hearing he
testified that they were permanently discharged; and (5) remaining
workers were immediately granted wage increases. Local Union 442,
Chauffers, Teamsters and Helpers, A.F.L. v. Wisconsin Hardware Co.,
Decision No. 2154 (WERB, 1949).
The Board cited Wisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Fred Rueping
Leather Co.3 for the proposition that the existence of a reason for a
discharge which would characterize it as an exercise of sound business
prudence is of great importance where there is a charge of discrimina-
tion, and the Board went on to state that the discharges involved in
this case, when viewed in the light of the above factors, particularly
the discharge of the two supervisors, should be classified as discrimina-
tory. It appears that the Board in so ruling completely ignored the
further statement in the Rueping case to the effect that if a valid reason
for discharge exits, then the motivating reason for a discharge may
not be material unless it can be shown that in the same type of circum-
stances, non-union men were not discharged.4 In so phrasing its opinion
the Court appears to cast the burden of proof on the complainant to
3 228 Wis. 473, 498, 279 N.W. 673, 684 (1937).
4,"... When a valid reason as heretofore defined is found to be present, it is
relatively difficult and may be impossible to more than guess which reason
motivated the discharge. The board could find discrimination here only by
finding that the assigned reason for the discharge of Assaf was false be-
cause if it was not the evidence is in such state that a finding of discrimina-
tion would be purse conjecture. Furthermore, we have some misgivings
whether, if a valid and sufficient reason for discharge exists, the real or
motivating reason has any materiality whatever, unless it can be shown that
in other cases where similar grounds for discharge of non-union men existed,
no such action was taken. The latter circumstance, of course, would point
strongly to discrimination ...We are unable to read out of the alleged
finding of fact any finding at all with respect to the existence of sufficient
cause for discharge. It is merely stated that the evidence as to whether the
entry was false was conflicting, and that if it was false, it is improbable that
it was intentionally so, in view of the small amount involved. There follows
a statement of the board's belief that the alleged false entry was not the real
reason for the discharge, but a pretext, and that the controlling reason was
his union membership .... Had there been a clear-cut finding that the dis-
missal was because of union activities on the part of Assaf, it might be argued
that this included a finding that the reason for discharge assigned by de-
fendant did not exist. However, the findings attempt specifically to deal with
this question but by reason of their equivocal nature fail to resolve it, and
we are not in a position to aid the situation by construction. It follows that
the findings do not support the order with reference to Assaf, and that that
portion of the order requiring his restoration must be set aside and thejudgment modified to this extent." Ibid.
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prove the lack of valid reason for the discharge in order to establish
the forbidden discrimination. Indeed, in many cases the Board itself
has found lack of discrimination where a valid reason, though slight,
was shown and ostensibly relied upon at the time of the discharge. 5
Further illustrating this burden of proof rationale is the fact that in
a number of the Board's decisions, where discrimination was found,
the Board expressly found that the sole reason for the discharge was
to influence in some way the discharged employee and/or remaining
employes in their union relationships.8 Thus the Board recognizes the
5 Andrew Lawniczak v. David Devroy, Decision No. 124 (WERB, 1940) ; Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local No.
64 v. Quality Food Products Co., Decision No. 142 (WERB, 1940); Wiscon-
sin State Council of Carpenters and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, Local No. 1264 v. Jackson Box Co. and Boxmakers In-
dependent Union No. 1, Decision No. 157 (WERB, 1941); Wilbur Lindsley
v. George Hougard, Decision No. 300 (WERB, 1941); Hotel Resturant Em-
ployees' and Bartenders International Alliance v. Mrs. John Shaughnessy,
Decision No. 311 (WERB, 1941); Drivers, Dairy Employee's and Helpers
Local Union No. 434 v. Ryser Cheese Co., Decision No. 1089 (WERB, 1947);
Norbert Peil v. Mr. Edward D. Cahoon, Decision No. 1470 (WERB, 1947);
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of Amer-
ica, (CIO) Local No. 180 v. J. I. Case Co., Decision No. 1593A (WERB,
1948) ; International Association of Machinists Lodge No. 1825 v. Reed Motor
Co., Decision No. 1681 (WERB, 1948); Clark Clary v. Flo-Torque Corpora-,
tion, Decision No. 1708 (WERB, 1948) ; International Longshoremen's Asso-
ciation, Local 815 v. Terminal Storage Co., Decision No. 2026 (WERB, 1949) ;
International Association of Cleaners and Dyehouse Workers, Local 111 v.
Leo Halverson, Decision No. 2050 (WERB, 1949); General Drivers and
Helpers Union Local 662 AFL v. Knapp Creamery Co., Decision No. 2093
(WERB, 1949).
6 Truck Drivers and Dairy Employees Local Union No. 870 v. James T. Farrell,
Decision No. 1336 (WERB, 1947); John Disch v. Carver Ice Cream Co.,
Decision No. 1803 (WERB, 1948); UAW of AFL Region No. 9 v. Gilson
Bros., Decision No. 1831-B (WERB, 1948), (In this case the board also
comments on the quantum of evidence necessary by stating that the discrim-
inatory character of the discharge is shown by the preponderance of the evi-
dence even though employer attempted to show lack of diligence on part of
employee as reason for discharge); Kuaka v. E. A. Schroeder doing business
as Schroeder Trucking Co. and Arnold, Decition No. 2231 (WERB, 1949);
In two very recent decisions of the Board, Mrs. Myrtle Young v. Mr. Arlin
De Cleene, Decision No. 2284 (WERB, 1950) and Jerry Schroeder v. Mr.
Arlin De Cleene, Decision No. 2285 (WERB, 1950), both decided on the same
day, the discharges of the complainants were held discriminatory in the face
of the employer's contention that the discharges were necessary to reduce ex-
penses. The finding of fact states that the respective discharges were ". . . for
the purpose primarily of discouraging membership in the union . . ." and there
is no finding negativing the existence of the employer's alleged reason for
the discharge. On the basis of the Rueping case and the long line of the
Board's decisions it is felt by this writer that these findings cannot sustain
the Board's conclusion of law that an unfair labor practice exists and the
consequent mandate of the Board ordering an offer of reinstatement in both
cases and that the employer make the complainants whole for loss of pay.
This follows from the fact that the Board's jurisdiction to order positive
action on the part of an employer is dependant upon a valid finding that the
elements of an unfair labor practice exist. In these two cases the essential
finding that either the discrimination was the sole cause of the discharges
or that there was no valid reason for the discharges is lacking. However,
the Board might have placed itself on safe ground if it had taken advantage
of the Rueping case doctrine that sudden change in job tenure coupled with
[Vol. 34
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requirement that discrimination be the only reason for discharge in
order to bring employers within the provisions of the anti-discrimina-
tion clauses of the statute. The above reasoning may be considered
to be the broad rule as far as the Board is concerned, even though
it has in its decisions made what appear to be departures from its
strict application. These seeming departures are rare and usually are
found in cases where company policy, as evidenced by the history of
job tenure, has suddenly changed at the same time that union activity
became known to the employer.7 An example of this type of exception
is found in the instant case. The Board characterized the discharge
of the seven nontitled union member warehouse employes as dis-
criminatory, even though the slump in the employer's business should
characterize them as for just cause in the absence of the employer's
securing replacements. It appears that the only real basis that the
Board had for such a holding was the departure of the employer from
its past policy of job security with attendant overall decrease in hours
per man when necessary, and the adoption of a new policy of dis-
charging enough men so that those remaining would have full time
work. Therefore the Board in effect again followed the rule that dis-
crimination must be the sole cause of a discharge in order for the dis-
charge to be classified as discriminatory. And the discharges must still
fall within the class described in the Rueping case, and it must be
shown that in the same type of circumstances non-union men were not
discharged in the past. Thus it would appear that one set of coinci-
dences very likely to result in a finding of discriminatory discharge is
sudden union activity coupled with equally sudden change of job
tenure policy which results in the discharge of one or more employes
active in union organization. Further, the above discussion illustrates
the presence of the subjective factor and its inherent insusceptability
to objective proof in the list of problems encountered by a complainant
trying to sustain a charge of discriminatory discharge against an em-
ployer. In the absence of a sudden change in job tenure policy, if
almost any valid cause for discharge exists the employer may seize
union activity may be the foundation of a finding that discrimination is the
sole cause of the discharge and that therefore the unfair labor practice of dis-
criminatory discharge exists. This type of finding could be predicated on
the fact that complainants in these two cases were employed for a period of
more than two years and more than one year respectively. The Board returned
to its former type of finding in a case decided two months after the De Cleene
cases in deciding Int'l. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, Local No. 43, AFL v. Mariondale Farms, Decision
No. 2341 (WERB, 1950), where the Board expressly found that the sole
cause of the discharge, which was held an unfair labor practice, was discrim-
ination. The writer has cited these cases at length because they are not
digested for easy reference anywhere.
7 Laundry Workers International Union, Local No. 229 (AFL) v. Stoughton
Cleaners and Laundry, Decision No. 47 (WERB, 1940); Eau Claire Indus-
trial Union Council v. Skogmo Cafe, Decision No. 136 (WERB, 1940);
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upon it and very likely avoid a finding of discriminatory discharge. In
fact the subjective factor cannot be avoided in any consideration of
the term "discriminatory discharge", because by definition an employer
cannot be found guilty of intentional discrimination unless he can be
shown to have known of the union activity which impels the discrimina-
tion.8 Thus the factors which must be shown to exist in order to sus-
tain an action for discriminatory discharge are: (1) a discharge which
has for its sole cause a discriminatory motive, and (2) a knowledge of
union activity in the employer in order that the subjective intent may
be established.
Another important consideration is apparent in the case under
discussion. Discharges, in order to be characterized as discriminatory,
must be shown to be individually discriminatoryY Though the Board
found the discharges of the warehouse employes discriminatory, still
the Board found the discharge of the office worker a valid exercise
of the employer's prerogative to discharge for cause. Thus the Board
followed the policy that a finding of unfair labor practice with respect
to one or more facets of a case does not permeate the whole case and
all its parts with the unfair labor practice stigma.10
ELWIN ZARWELL
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local No. 1748
v. Appleton Chair Corp., Decision No. 170 (WERB, 1941); International
Union, United Automobile Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of
of America (CIO) v. Micron Tool and Machine Co., Decision No. 1736
(WERB, 1948); United Automobile Workers of America AFL Region No. 9
Local 963 v. Winneconne Stamping Company, Decision No. 2044 (WERB,
1949) ; also see discussion in note 6.
8 C.I.O. v. Waukesha Foundry Co., Decision No. 1459 (WERB, 1947) ; A.F. of
L. v. Aerial Cutlery Manufacturing, Decision No. 1469 (WERB, 1947); Nor-
bert Peil v. Mr. Edward D. Cahoon, Decision No. 1470 (WERB, 1947); 0. A.
Jerikowic v. Midwest Transformer Co., Decision No. 1490 (WERB, 1947);
Fred Wickersheim v. Yawkey-Bissell Corp., Decision No. 2088 (WERB, 1949).
9 General Drivers, Dairy Products Employees and Helpers Union, Local No.
56 v. Sheboygan Dairymen's Cooperative Association, Inc., Decision No. 1012
(WERB, 1946) ; Local No. 662 General Drivers and Helpers Union Affiliated
with AF of L v. Neuheisel Lime Works, Decision No. 1230 (WERB, 1947).
20 The above discussion probably disposes of most of what is commonly thought
of when the term "discriminatory discharge" is used, but a very important
part of the field would be overlooked if this discussion did not concern itself
with employer action in accordance with agreements between employers and
unions. It is in this branch of the field that the employer must be extremely
careful for if he refuses to discharge in accordance with a union demand un-
der a valid contract which by its terms makes such discharge necessary, he
is subject to an action brought under the terms of Section 111.06 (1) (f) Wis.
Stats. of 1947, (". . . (1) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
individually or in concert with others: . . . (f) to violate the terms of a col-
lective bargaining agreement . . ." Denver Olson v. International Union of
Operating Engineers, Local No. 139, AFT, and Fielding and Shepley, General
Contractors, Decision No. 259 (WERB, 1941); George Schuman v. Northern
Transportation Co., Decision No. 1332 (WERB, 1947); Hugh Fitzgerald v.
Myer Stores et. al., Decision No. 1466 (WERB, 1947); Laundry and Dry
Cleaning Drivers Local Union No. 360 AFL v. Dy-Dee Wash, Inc., Decision
No. 1634 (WERB, 1948.) whereas, if he does discharge in accordance with
a union demand and either the contract is found invalid for procedural rea-
sons or the contract does not by its terms make the discharge mandatory then
[Vol. 34
